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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has closely
scrutinized "reverse payment" patent settlements in which brand-name drug
manufacturers make payments to generic manufacturers.1 The FTC is
concerned that such settlements harm consumers by delaying the market
entry of lower-priced generic drugs.2
Despite a growing consensus among the courts that such settlements are
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1. How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal Government Pay
More for Much Needed Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Com., Trade, and
Consumer Prot., 111 th Cong. 2, 8 (2009) (statement of J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed.
Trade Comm'n).
2. Id. at 2.
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only anticompetitive under a narrow set of circumstances,' it is likely that
antitrust scrutiny will continue to increase over the next several years. In
2007, then-Presidential Candidate Barack Obama raised specific concerns
over such settlements in laying out his views on antitrust enforcement
policy.4 Jon Leibowitz, the current Chairman of the FTC, recently called
eliminating anticompetitive patent settlements "one of the most important
objectives for antitrust enforcement in America today.",5  Bills were
introduced in both houses of Congress in early 2009 that would prohibit all
settlements involving payments from brand-name to generic
manufacturers.
6
This article will present an analytical framework for evaluating the
competitive effects of patent settlements between branded and generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers, including those involving reverse payments,
and demonstrate that such settlements can benefit consumers. While
continued scrutiny of such settlements is important, broad brush treatments
are inappropriate and only a more individualized evaluation can accurately
determine the competitive effects of a particular settlement agreement.
II. COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Consumers derive great benefit from both brand-name and generic drugs.
Innovative brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers benefit consumers by
developing new drugs, while generic pharmaceutical firms benefit
consumers by driving down drug prices through competition. Thus, the
challenge of competition policy in this area (as in all highly innovative
industries) is to strike the appropriate balance between providing incentives
to encourage innovation, while stimulating competition to lower drug
prices.
A. Innovation and Patent Protection
Innovation is the lifeblood of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2007, the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries invested nearly $60 billion in
research and development (R&D).7 As described by the Congressional
3. Ken Letzler & Sonia Pfaffenroth, Patent Settlement Legislation: Good Medicine or
Wrong Prescription?, 23 ANTITRUST 81, 82 (2009).
4. Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27,
2007) (transcript available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/pres0l.ashx).
5. Comm'r Jon Leibowitz, Concurring decision regarding Federal Trade Commission v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals (Feb. 2, 2009).
6. S. 369, 11 1th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1706, 11 1th Cong (2009). The current version of S.
369, as revised in committee, provides an exception "if the parties to such agreement
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the
agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement."
7. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL
[Vol. 19
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Budget Office (CBO), "[t]he pharmaceutical industry is one of the most
research-intensive industries in the United States... Pharmaceutical firms
invest as much as five times more in research and development, relative to
their sales, than the average U.S. manufacturing firm."
8
Since 1990, R&D by pharmaceutical manufacturers has led to the
approval of an average of nearly thirty new drugs (molecular entities) and
dozens of newly approved formulations or other modifications to existing
drugs each year.9
The process of developing new drugs is lengthy, costly, and uncertain; as
such, protection of the intellectual property rights underlying these
innovations is critical to encouraging pharmaceutical manufacturers to
continue to invest in R&D. Only a small fraction of medicines tested are
eventually approved for patient use,10 and only twenty to thirty percent of
those approved eventually recoup their R&D investment." The
development of new drugs entails a considerable amount of time and
money, and such costs are rising.1 2 Recent studies estimate that the
development of a new drug takes ten to fifteen years on average 13 and costs
over $1.3 billion.1 4 Strong protection of intellectual property rights, and the
accompanying rewards, provides an incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to make such a large, high-risk investment.
B. Generic Competition
Generic manufacturers often bring bioequivalent versions of brand-name
drugs to market as soon as the brand-name drug loses patent protection, or
when generic manufacturers are able to produce noninfringing generic
INDUSTRY PROFILE 2008 at 2-3 (2008).
8. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7-9 (2006) [hereinafter CBO 2006].
9. FDA, CDER APPROVAL TIMES FOR PRIORITY AND STANDARD NMEs AND NEW BLAs-
CY 1993-2008 (2009).
10. Tufts Ctr. For the study of Drug Dev., Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move
throughout the Development and Approval Process, Nov. 1, 2001 (indicating that only 1 of
every 5,000 medicines tested is eventually approved).
11. JOHN M. VERNON, JOSEPH H. GOLEC & JOSEPH A. DIMASI, DRUG DEVELOPMENT
COSTS WHEN FINANCIAL RISK IS MEASURED USING THE FAMA-FRENCH THREE FACTOR
MODEL 3 (2009); Henry G. Grabowski, John M. Vernon & Joseph A. DiMasi, Returns on
Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS
Suppl. 3, 23 (2002).
12. See Grabowski et al., supra note 11, at 19; Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen &
Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs,
22 J, HEALTH ECON. 151, 163 (2003).
13. CBO 2006, supra note 8, at 15; DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 164.
14. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 469, 476 (2007) (including both
cash outlays and costs of capitalization).
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products. 15 Numerous economic studies have consistently found that the
entry of a competing generic manufacturer typically leads to lower average
drug prices, and that this price competition typically intensifies with the
entry of additional generic manufacturers. 16 For example, the CBO
concluded in a review of the evidence that:
The dramatic rise in generic sales since 1984 has held down average
prices for drugs that are no longer protected by a patent... [A]verage
prices fall primarily because consumers switch from the higher-priced
innovator drug to the lower-priced generics. To be on the receiving end
of that switch, generic manufacturers compete with each other intensely
in the area of price, partly because they sell identical products. The
increased use of generic drugs has kept total spending on prescription
drugs below what it might otherwise have been.
Given the significant benefits to consumers that result from both
innovation and lower prices, policy-makers have sought to facilitate generic
competition within a framework intended to provide brand-name
manufacturers with sufficient incentives to continue to innovate.
C. The Hatch- Waxman Amendments
1. Introduction
In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments (Hatch-
Waxman) 18 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which
sought to balance the benefits from innovation with those from generic
entry. 19 Hatch-Waxman established the current framework for patent
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry, a framework that, though modified
since its inception, remains largely intact.20 Any analysis of the economics
15. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 331, 331 (1992).
16. See id. at 335 (explaining that branded manufacturers may increase their prices in
response to generic entry, but the net effect of lower generic prices and higher branded prices
is generally to lower average prices for the molecule); see also Richard G. Frank & David S.
Salkever, Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for Pharmaceuticals, 59 S. ECON. J. 165, 173
(1992); Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston, & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration,
Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, 1991, at 26; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 13 (1998) [hereinafter CBO 1998].
17. CBO 1998, supra note 16, at 13.
18. Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
19. See Caves et al., supra note 16, at 1-2.
20. Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity
Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 (2007)
[Vol. 19
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of patent settlements must begin with an understanding of this framework.
2. FDA approval prior to Hatch-Waxman
Since 1962, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has required
pharmaceutical companies to prove that new brand-name drugs are "safe
and effective" prior to approval.21 Brand-name drug manufacturers provide
such evidence by conducting costly and lengthy clinical trials. This process
of conducting clinical trials and obtaining FDA approval, however,
decreases the effective life of pharmaceutical patents because FDA
approval is typically granted several years after a patent is granted.22 Before
Hatch-Waxman, the FDA also required generic manufacturers to conduct
their own safety and efficacy studies; generic manufacturers, however,
could not begin such studies until patents on the brand-name drug had
already expired. 23
3. Overview of Hatch-Waxman
The intent of Hatch-Waxman was to alter the FDA approval process in
two important ways:
(1) With an eye towards brand-name manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman
sought to increase patent protection and to strengthen incentives for
24innovation. Recognizing that the lengthy FDA approval process often
substantially reduced the effective life of pharmaceutical patents, Hatch-
Waxman allowed brand-name manufacturers to apply to extend the life of
these patents in order to regain some of the patent life consumed by clinical
trials and the FDA approval process.25 Specifically, the brand-name
manufacturer could apply for an extension on one patent equal to half of the
time spent on clinical trials plus all of the time spent in FDA review, subject
to a maximum extension of five years and a maximum effective patent life
26
of 14 years.
(2) With an eye towards generic manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman
attempted to foster competition by streamlining the approval process for
generics, thereby reducing entry costs and speeding the generic product to
market.27 Specifically, Hatch-Waxman allowed generic pharmaceutical
[hereinafter Generic Competition].
21. FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssIoN, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT ExPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 3 (2002) [hereinafter FTC 2002].
22. CBO 1998, supra note 16, at 39.
23. Generic Competition, supra note 20, at 491-492.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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companies to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),
simply referencing the safety and efficacy results submitted by the brand-
name manufacturer, rather than requiring the performance of new clinical
trials, so long as the generic drug could demonstrate "bioequivalence,"
which means that the rate and extent of absorption of the generic drug is not
significantly different from that of the brand-name drug when administered
with the same dosage.28
Brand-name manufacturers are required to file information about any
relevant patents with the FDA. The ANDA filer must certify one of the
following:
(1) the required patent information has not been filed by the brand-
name manufacturer;
29
(2) the patent has expired;3 °
(3) the patent will expire, identifying the expiration date;31 or
(4) the patent is invalid and/or not infringed.32
The latter representation is known as a Paragraph IV certification.
Since Hatch-Waxman, competition from generic drugs has grown
significantly; the market share of generics has grown from nineteen percent
in 1984 to nearly sixty-seven percent today.33
4. Patent litigation under Hatch-Waxman
Hatch-Waxman established several important aspects of patent litigation
between brand-name and generic manufacturers. First, an ANDA filer who
makes a Paragraph IV certification that the existing patent is invalid or not
infringed must notify the patent holder (and the branded manufacturer) of
the basis for its assertion.34 Under Hatch-Waxman, if a brand-name
manufacturer files suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of a
Paragraph IV certification, the brand-name company is granted an
automatic stay of FDA final approval of the generic company's ANDA
until the earliest of: (1) thirty months from the notification date; (2) a
28. Id.
29. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2009).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, CELEBRATING THE PAST, DEFINING
THE FUTURE 1 (2009).
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (2009).
[Vol. 19
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district court decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed; or (3)
expiration of the patent. 35 This is commonly known as a "30-month stay." If
the patent holder does not file suit within the forty-five day window, then
the FDA may approve the ANDA immediately, provided all other
requirements are met.36
Second, upon approval, the first generic pharmaceutical company to file
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification for a particular drug is awarded
a "180-day exclusivity period," during which time the FDA may not
approve any Paragraph IV ANDAs filed subsequently for the same drug.
37
The start of the 180-day exclusivity period is triggered by commercial
marketing of the first filer's product. 38 If the first filer does not exercise its
exclusive rights in a timely fashion, forfeiture of its eligibility for
exclusivity can occur.39 The substantial profits available during the 180-day
exclusivity period (in which the exclusive generic can both charge a higher
price and capture a larger share of sales than it could in the face of
competition from other generic manufacturers) provide generic firms with
an additional incentive to be the first to challenge potentially invalid patents
or to invent around the patented technology by developing a noninfringing
alternative.
D. Patent Litigation and Settlement Agreements
ANDA filings frequently result in patent litigation. From 1998 to 2000,
approximately twenty percent of filed ANDAs contained Paragraph IV
certifications, where the generic manufacturer claimed that the brand-name
manufacturer's patent(s) were invalid or not infringed.40 A study by the
FTC of ANDA filings between 1992 and 2000 found that a Paragraph IV
certification resulted in patent litigation nearly seventy-five percent of the
time.
41
Most patent litigation is resolved through a settlement between the
35. Id.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2009).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2009). Under certain circumstances (e.g., two generic
manufacturers file ANDAs containing a Paragraph IV certification for the same branded
drug on the same day) the FDA may grant "shared exclusivity" in which both generic
manufacturers can receive final approval simultaneously and potentially share the 180-day
exclusivity period.
38. Id. For products subject to the prior law before 2003, the 180 days would also be
triggered by a court decision of invalidity or noninfringement of the relevant patent. Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
39. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. PUB. L.
No. 108-173. § 1102. 117 Stat. 2066, 2457.
40. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 10.
41. Id.at9-10,13.
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parties.42 From 1992 to 2000, nearly forty percent of litigations against the
first ANDA filer resulted in a settlement.43 Similarly, Barr, one of the
largest generic manufacturers, has settled nearly half of the thirty patent
cases that it has been involved with between 1993 and 2007. 44
These settlements take many forms and can include the following types
of provisions:
* An agreed-upon date at which time the generic manufacturer
will enter the market (with or without royalty payments to the
brand-name manufacturer);
e Cash payments from the brand-name manufacturer to the
generic;
* Ancillary business transactions such as cross-licensing or supply
agreements; and
* Agreement by the brand-name manufacturer not to launch or
license an authorized generic for some period after generic entry.45
Pharmaceutical manufacturers that settle patent litigation are required to
report information on settlements to the FTC and Department of Justice
(DOJ), and the FTC publishes annual reports summarizing those
settlements.46
The following table provides a summary of the FTC's classification of
settlements that have been entered into over the last several years between
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.
47
42. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 43 RAND J. of Econ.,
391, 392 (2003).
43. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 15-16.
44. Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should it be
Prohibited?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4-23 (2007)
(statement of Bruce L. Downey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Barr
Pharmaceuticals, Inc).
45. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 25-26.
46. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. PUB. L.
No. 108-173. §1102. 117 Stat. 2066, 2457.
47. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2004 Fig. 11 (2004);
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2005 3 (2005); BUREAU OF COMPETITION,
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION, DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2006 3 (2006); BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY
[Vol. 19
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FY 2005 11 7 1 3
FY 2006 28 8 6 14
FY 2007 33 8 11 14
FY 2008 16
FY 2009 19
III. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS: SHORT-RUN
A. Overview
1. Patent settlements reduce the direct and
indirect costs of litigation
Patent settlements provide clear benefits by reducing litigation costs. In
general, the cost of litigating includes (1) direct litigation costs, (2) indirect
costs, such as requiring the attention of company executives, distracting
them from the operation of the business, and (3) costs due to the uncertainty
of litigation outcomes.49 Further, there are additional costs to society as a
whole, including increased congestion of the court system and the
allocation of corporate resources towards dispute resolution as opposed to
innovation and production activities.50 Manufacturers generally pass on
2007 3 (2007); Federal Trade Commission, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs
Cost Consumers Billions, An FTC Staff Study, January 2010, p. 1.
48. As defined by the FTC, compensation to generic manufacturers may be in the form
of cash, an ancillary business transaction, or an agreement by the brand name manufacturer
not to launch or license an authorized generic for some period after generic entry. As
discussed in more detail below, an ancillary business transaction does not constitute
compensation where the transaction was conducted at fair market value. According to the
FTC reports, many of these settlements also include compensation to the brand name
manufacturer however the reports do not provide sufficient information to determine
whether there was a net payment to the generic. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS
FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY
2006 3 (2006).
49. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation 18-19
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 07-
08, 2008).
50. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 394.
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some portion of these costs to consumers, who ultimately suffer by paying
higher prices.
2. Patent settlements have the potential to be anticompetitive
While patent settlements between brand-name and generic manufacturers
have the potential to benefit consumers, they are also capable, under certain
circumstances, of stifling competition and harming consumer interests. The
potential for anticompetitive outcomes is increased when the settlement is
with the first generic filer, rather than with a subsequent generic filer, and
the first filer does not relinquish its exclusivity.5 1 Under Hatch-Waxman,
the first generic filer receives 180 days of marketing exclusivity.5 2 This
creates the potential for an anticompetitive effect to the extent that delaying
entry by the first filer could delay entry by all other generics as well. Prior
to 2003, when much of the concern over patent settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry originated, first filing generic manufacturers that
settled patent litigation were not required to relinquish their exclusivity.53
Thus, a settlement with a first filer specifying an entry date well into the
future could also prevent other generics from entering before that date.
54
Recognizing the potential anticompetitive effects of such a situation, the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, a 2003
law, introduced additional restrictions on "parking" the 180-day
exclusivity.55 Importantly, the law was changed so that a generic
manufacturer forfeits its exclusivity if (1) the brand-name and generic
manufacturers reach a settlement agreement, (2) the settlement is
challenged by the FTC or DOJ, and (3) the agreement is determined to
violate antitrust law.5 6 This change reduces the antitrust concerns regarding
settlements.
The competitive effects of a particular settlement will depend greatly
upon the strength of the underlying patent.57 A patent gives the brand-name
manufacturer the right, within certain boundaries, to exclude competition.58
51. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 25-26.
52. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2009).
53. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1102(a)(2)(D)(i)(V), 117 Stat. 2459 (2003) (addressing the
anticompetitive concerns by voiding the 180-day exclusivity period in certain
circumstances).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2009).
55. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1102(a)(2)(D), 117 Stat. 2458 (2003).
56. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1102(a)(2)(D)(i)(V), 117 Stat. 2459 (2003).
57. Some courts consider how a "reasonable person" would objectively evaluate the
strength of the patent. See, e.g., Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp.
2d 986, 992-93 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
58. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 395-96 (discussing patents as probabilistic property
rights).
[Vol. 19
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If the patent is quite strong, and likely to be found valid and infringed, then
even a settlement with an agreed-upon entry date well into the future, but
before the patent's expiration, may bring generic drugs to market sooner
than the expected outcome from continued litigation. Moreover, there are
frequently several generic manufacturers challenging a brand-name patent
at any given time; where this is the case, a settlement agreement with the
first-filing generic has even less potential for anticompetitive effect where
the brand-name patent is weak. While the incentive may not be as strong as
that of the first filer (due to the 180-day exclusivity), other generic
manufacturers continue to have an incentive to challenge patents they
believe are invalid or that they do not infringe.59
In contrast, if the patent is quite weak, and likely to be found invalid or
noninfringed, then even a settlement with an entry date in the near future
may delay generic entry and harm consumers. Considering the strength of a
patent in real-world patent litigation is complex, but necessary. The next
section presents an economic framework for this evaluation.
B. Economic Framework
1. Basic Model
Determining the scope of patent settlements that could raise antitrust
concerns amounts to evaluating the following question: Which settlements
would be in the economic interest of both the brand-name and generic
manufacturer, but would harm consumers, relative to continuing litigation?
Answering this question requires modeling the settlement decisions of both
the brand-name and generic manufacturers, as well as evaluating the benefit
to consumers from generic entry.
The standard economic model of settlements compares each party's
potential economic benefit from settling to the potential economic benefits
of pursuing litigation.60 A comparison of the potential benefits determines
the range of settlement terms that both parties would find preferable to
continued litigation - in other words, those settlement terms that would
feasibly lead to the end of the litigation.
Once the range of feasible settlements is established, one needs to
59. The 180-day exclusivity period provides motivation for generic manufacturers to
bear the cost and risk associated with developing generic versions of brand name drugs and
challenging brand name patents. But at the time of a settlement with the first-filing generic,
many subsequent generic entrants may have already incurred many of these costs. Thus,
even relatively small profits expected by a subsequent filer could provide the incentive to
continue to challenge the brand name patent.
60. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfield, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolutions, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1067-1097 (1989) (general
discussion of the settlement decision).
11
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61determine which of these settlements, if any, would benefit consumers.
After all, consumers are not a party to the settlements, and so one might
imagine that there could be settlements, which benefit brand-name and
generic manufacturers that do not benefit consumers.
For expositional purposes, we start with a highly simplified model of a
patent settlement between brand-name and generic manufacturers. Assume:
" The parties are considering settlement at the beginning of Year 1
* The patent expires at the end of Year 10
" The generic manufacturer both believes that it has and in fact has
a fifty percent chance of winning the patent case (and the brand-
name manufacturer also has, and perceives, a fifty percent chance
of winning)
" There are no costs to litigation and litigation is instantaneous
" Both parties are risk neutral.
* The only settlement tool available is the date of generic entry
(i.e., lump sum payments, rojalty payments, and other business
transactions are not allowed).
As we describe below, many of these assumptions do not affect the
conclusions, but rather allow for an easier grasp of the intuition underlying
the economic model. Other assumptions, however, will have important
effects on the conclusions. In the sections that follow, we will introduce
real-world complexities and examine the implications of enriching the
model.
Under these original assumptions, the expected outcome from litigation
is generic entry at the end of Year 5. There is a fifty percent chance of
immediate entry if the generic wins and a fifty percent chance of entry at
the end of Year 10 if the brand-name wins. The settlement decision
amounts to a comparison of the profits from settling to a simple average of
the profits assuming immediate generic entry (fifty percent chance the
generic wins) and the profits assuming generic entry in Year 10 (fifty
percent chance the generic loses). Under the assumptions provided above,
the simple average of profits from litigation is equivalent to the profits from
61. In this paper, the term "consumers" indicates those individuals that ultimately pay
for prescription drugs. In reality, "consumers" are a combination of patients, private insurers,
and government.
62. Other assumptions include: (1) Total prescriptions are constant in each year, as is the
share of prescriptions by the brand name and generic manufacturers after generic entry; (2)
there is no time value of money for either party; and (3) after entry, there will be only one
generic competitor.
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entry at the end of Year 5.
In this simple framework, the only tool the parties can use in settlement
negotiations is the date of entry of the generic. As shown in Figure 1, the
brand-name manufacturer would agree to a settlement with generic entry at
any point after the end of Year 5, whereas the generic manufacturer would
agree to a settlement with generic entry at any point up until the end of Year
5. Thus, no settlement can be mutually agreeable to the two parties. The
settlement ranges of the two parties are contiguous, but do not overlap.
Of course, this simple model assumes away many complexities present
in the real world - indeed, some of the very complexities that provide
important incentives for litigating parties to settle. In the next section, we
relax some of these assumptions and demonstrate that doing so leads to a
range of reasonable conditions under which patent settlements can benefit
consumers.
FIGURE 1
Settlement with Generic Entry Date
Generic Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Brand Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Settlment Patent
Talks Expiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
Note: There are no settlements that both the Brand and Generic prefer to Litigation.
2. Litigation costs
An important motivation for parties to settle litigation is that litigation is
costly; the oversimplified model presented above ignores this motivation.
We now introduce litigation costs into the model and show that it leads to a
range of settlements that would be agreeable to both the brand-name and
generic manufacturers, while also benefiting consumers
Figure 2 shows that the costs of litigation lead the brand-name
manufacturer to be willing to accept settlements where the generic enters
before the end of Year 5 (i.e., earlier than the brand-name manufacturer
would be willing to accept based only on the profits from winning or losing
the litigation). Similarly, in order to avoid litigation costs the generic would
be willing to accept settlements, which would have it entering after the end
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of Year 5 (i.e., later than it would be willing to accept based only on the
chance of winning or losing the litigation). Thus, litigation costs expand the
range of settlements that would be agreeable to both parties.63 In this way,
litigation costs create the possibility of some settlements - those that would
lead the generic to enter before the end of Year 5 - that would benefit
consumers relative to continued litigation. Accounting for the fact that part
of litigation costs are passed on and ultimately borne by consumers
broadens the range of procompetitive settlements.
FIGURE 2
Settlement with Generic Entry Date Litigation Costs
Brand Prefers Settlement to Litigation
4 Generic Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Procompetitive
Settlements Settlement Range
Settlement I  [Patent
Talks Expiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year I End of Year 5 End of Year 10
Of course, the particular size of settlement ranges shown in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 is not meant to convey the relative likelihood of any particular type
of settlement, but simply to demonstrate the economic logic that certain
kinds of settlements exist. Indeed, what seems to be a clear distinction
between procompetitive and anticompetitive in these diagrams in fact can
be quite difficult to distinguish in the real world. Recall that our example
assumes a fifty percent chance that the generic manufacturer will win the
patent litigation, and that everyone knows that probability. In reality, the
precise strength of the patent is unknowable to the antitrust analyst or even
to the parties themselves. It will depend on a wide range of factors that
63. Because annual profits for the generic are lower than annual pre-generic entry profits
for the brand name manufacturer, the generic would be willing to give up more time in the
market to avoid those costs, assuming litigation costs for the brand name and the generic
manufacturers are similar.
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affect the outcome of litigation, including the documentary evidence, the
quality of presentations by counsel, the testimony of company witnesses,
the testimony of expert witnesses, and the particular judge and jury
assigned to the case. Whereas settlements with entry after Year 5 could
harm consumers under the assumptions we have presented, such settlements
could in fact be procompetitive if the generic manufacturer's chance of
winning the patent litigation was only, say, thirty percent.
3. Risk aversion
Another cost of litigation is the substantial uncertainty that litigation
creates. Economists model the cost of uncertainty using the concepts of
"risk aversion" and "risk premiums."64 For example, a risk-averse economic
actor will prefer to receive two dollars with certainty, rather than a fifty
percent chance at one dollar and a fifty percent chance at three dollars. That
is, risk-averse individuals prefer a certain outcome to uncertain outcomes
with the same average or expected value but some degree of variance. 65 A
risk premium is the amount of money that a party would pay to avoid taking
a risk.66 In the example above, the risk premium is the amount the
individual would pay in order to receive the two dollars with certainty
rather than the option with fifty-fifty odds. The concept of a risk premium
allows us to model uncertainty in the same way we do other litigation costs
- where the risk premium is the additional cost to the parties created by the
uncertainty. Thus, just as in the discussion of litigation costs above, both
brand-name and generic manufacturers would accept lower expected profits
under a settlement, rather than risk an uncertain outcome in litigation. As
shown in Figure 3, the effects of accounting for risk aversion are similar to
with the effects of accounting for litigation costs. 67
64. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBiNFELD, MICROECONOMICS, § 5.2 (7th ed.
2009).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Similarly, if consumers are risk averse, accounting for this would broaden the range
of procompetitive settlements.
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FIGURE 3
Settlement with Generic Entry Date Risk
Aversion and Litigation Costs
Brand Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Generic Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Settlement Range
Procompetitive
SettlementsSettlement Patent
Talks Expiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
Is it reasonable to assume that large pharmaceutical companies are risk
averse? After all, a basic tenet of financial economics holds that firms
owned by (and effectively managed for) well-diversified shareholders
should be risk neutral. The risk from a particular litigation can be largely
eliminated through diversification-in this case, by investing in many
projects or holding many stocks. However, this argument ignores two
important realities. First, it ignores the so-called principal-agent problem
that can exist between the managers of the firm (in this case, the executives
with the power to choose between settling or continuing litigation) and the
shareholders of the firm.68 While the firm's shareholders may be risk
neutral, because they can diversify their risks over many investments,
managers whose jobs and salaries depend on their current employer may be
risk averse. 69 Second, not all pharmaceutical companies - not even all
brand-name manufacturers - are large firms owned by diversified
shareholders. For some brand-name manufacturers, the financial health of
the company may depend importantly on the success of a single drug line.
68. For a general discussion of the principal-agent problem see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 64, at § 17.4.
69. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay? 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 437, 450 (2003).
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4. Information asymmetries
Information asymmetries are another important component of settlement
decisions. 70 Both the brand-name and the generic manufacturer are likely to
have information that the other party does not possess. The generic
manufacturer, for example, may have better information about its ability to
manufacture a generic version of the brand-name product, such as
knowledge that manufacturing problems will delay its entry beyond the
point at which it receives FDA approval (or that make such entry less
effective). The brand-name manufacturer would be unlikely to know of
such problems at the time of the settlement discussions.
The brand-name manufacturer, on the other hand, may have better
information about the expected size of the market for the product in the
future. Brand-name pharmaceuticals generally have a limited life cycle; a
brand-name drug often faces increasing competition from newer and often
more effective brand-name products. 71 The brand-name manufacturer may,
for example, have specific knowledge of a next-generation product in its
development pipeline, which could substantially reduce the potential market
for the litigated drug in the future.
These are just two examples of information asymmetries; there are many
dimensions on which such asymmetries can exist. The parties may have
private information that alters their probabilities of winning the patent
litigation, about the competitive strategies (e.g., pricing) they plan to
employ after generic entry, or other factors.
We now introduce a specific example of information asymmetry to our
model. Assume that the generic manufacturer knows that, even if it wins the
patent litigation, manufacturing issues will prevent it from launching until
the beginning of Year 3 (two years from now). Assume also that the brand-
name manufacturer is unaware of this.
70. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving
Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some
Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1073 (2004).
71. See generally Jayanta Bhattacharya, A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price
Dynamics, 46 J. L. & Econ. 599 (2003).
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FIGURE 4
Settlement with Generic Entry Date Information
Asymmetry and Litigation Costs
Brand Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Generic Prefers Settlement to Litigation
Earliest Procompetitive
Possible SettlementsGeneric
Settlement Entr
Talks Expiration
Consumers Benefit from Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year I End of Year nd of Year 10
End of Year 6
In this case, as shown in Figure 4, the generic manufacturer would be
willing to agree to a settlement with entry as late as Year 6 (even later
factoring in litigation costs), which would give it an additional four years of
generic profits relative to the scenario when it litigates and loses. This
outcome splits the difference between the eight years of additional profits
(Year 3 through Year 10) it would receive if it won the litigation, and the
zero years if it lost. Similarly, consumers would be better off under a
settlement with a date up to and including Year 6. The brand-name
manufacturer, unaware that the generic has any production issues, has the
same preferences it did in the initial example: It would agree to any
settlement with generic entry as early as Year 5. Thus, as shown in Figure
4, procompetitive settlements with an entry date between Year 5 and Year 6
are feasible (and adding litigation costs or risk aversion to the model would
only expand the range of procompetitive settlements).
Litigation costs, risk aversion, and information asymmetries are only
three of the potential real-world complexities that can give rise to
procompetitive patent settlements between the brand-name and generic
manufacturer. For example, the preceding section has assumed that both
parties have identical expectations as to the outcome of the litigation. It is
highly likely, however, that the parties' expectations will differ at least to
some extent and perhaps greatly - and these differences can have
important effects on the ability of the parties to reach settlement and the
effects of those settlements on consumers. In the next section, we explore
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these and other issues in the specific context of reverse payment
settlements.
IV. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS:
SHORT-RUN
A. Overview
While the potential for patent settlements to be procompetitive is
generally recognized by economists, antitrust agencies, and the courts,72
"reverse payment" settlements have generated extensive debate in recent
years. 3 In these settlements, the parties settle the patent litigation and the
brand-name manufacturer allows the generic manufacturer to enter at or
after a particular date in the future (prior to the expiration of the patent) and
pays some form of compensation to the generic manufacturer. That
compensation can be in the form of cash payments or through a payment
associated with some other business transaction (e.g., a cross-licensing
agreement) where the brand-name manufacturer might allegedly "overpay"
the generic manufacturer or the generic manufacturer might allegedly
"underpay" the brand-name manufacturer. 74
The FTC and some antitrust scholars contend that these "reverse
payments" are on their face evidence that the settlements are nothing more
than a payment by the brand-name manufacturer to delay generic entry.75 In
this section, we show that such a perspective is flawed because reverse
payment settlements can serve to increase or decrease competition and
consumer welfare, depending upon the facts and circumstances surrounding
the settlement. Thus, a per se rule against such settlements would be
misguided. Indeed, a view allowing the possibility of reverse payments,
with appropriate scrutiny in specific cases (as is available to the FTC under
current law), has been adopted by most courts, and many scholars that have
addressed this issue.
76
B. Regulatory and Judicial Enforcement
1. History
The FTC began scrutinizing reverse payment settlements in the late
72. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 392-94.
73. Cotter, supra note 70, at 1069-70.
74. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 28-29, 34.
75. Rosch, supra note 1, at 2.
76. See, e.g., Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note 3, at 83; see generally Robert D. Willig
& John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy toward Agreements that settle Patent Litigation, THE
ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Fall 2004, at 655.
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1990S. 77 Initial challenges were directed at settlements where brand-name
manufacturers paid cash to generic manufacturers to settle patent
litigation.78 These challenges resulted in consent decrees.79
The FTC's most prominent challenge was against a settlement between
Schering-Plough (Schering) and two generic manufacturers involving
Schering's K-Dur (potassium chloride).8° Schering settled patent litigation
with both Upsher-Smith (Upsher) and ESI Lederle (ESI) in 1997.81 The
settlement agreement with Upsher included a related licensing agreement
where Schering paid Upsher a sixty million dollars royalty for five Upsher
drugs and provided a royalty-free license for Upsher to launch a generic
potassium chloride product in 2001 (five years before Schering's patent
expired in 2006).82 The settlement agreement with ESI included a cash
payment, as well as a fifteen million dollars royalty payment for two ESI
products, and provided a royalty-free license for ESI to launch a generic
potassium chloride product in 2004.83
The case has a long legal history, in which the disagreements over this
issue are on full display. The FTC brought suit against the three companies,
alleging that the royalty payments were simply disguised payments to delay
generic entry and that the patent settlement agreements were
anticompetitive.84 In 2002, the FTC's Administrative Law Judge ruled that
the appropriate legal standard was a "rule of reason" analysis, and that
under such an analysis the patent settlement agreements at issue were not
anticompetitive.85 The FTC appealed this decision to the full Commission,
which reversed the decision and concluded that the payments were indeed
anticompetitive. 86 Schering and Upsher then appealed the Commission's
opinion to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed the Commission's decision, finding that ultimately the
determination of competitive effects depends upon the strength of the
patent.87 The FTC appealed to the Supreme Court, which declined to hear
the case.
77. FTC 2002, supra note 21, at 1.
78. Id. at 1.
79. See FTC Decision and Order, In the Matter of Abbott Laboratories, No. C-3945
(May 22, 2000); FTC Decision and Order, In the Matter of Hoeschst, Carderm, and Andrx,
No. 9293 (May 8, 2001). These cases were often followed by private suits by direct and
indirect purchasers.
80. See generally, In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FTC 956 (2003).
81. Id. at 960, 962.
82. Id. at 961.
83. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11 th Cir. 2005).
84. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FTC at 958-59.
85. Id. at 964.
86. Id. at 968.
87. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076.
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2. Current status
After these developments, reverse payment settlements are now treated
quite differently by the various regulatory agencies and Courts. The FTC
views reverse payment settlements as essentially per se illegal.88 Despite the
adverse ruling by the Eleventh Circuit in Schering, the FTC has continued
to demonstrate an interest in challenging reverse payment settlements. 89 In
contrast, the DOJ submitted a brief urging the Supreme Court not to hear
the Schering case - a position at odds with the FTC's view.90 Elsewhere,
the DOJ has explained that ". . settlements between an ANDA filer and the
patent holder [even those with a reverse payment] also can benefit
consumer welfare. 91 Accordingly, the DOJ does not believe per se liability
under the antitrust laws is the appropriate standard., 92 In the Obama
administration, the DOJ has modified its stance on reverse payment
settlements and, while still acknowledging that they have the potential to be
procompetitive, recommends that the burden of proof be on the
manufacturers to demonstrate these procompetitive benefits.93
Courts that have evaluated these reverse payment settlements have also
reached varying conclusions. In the Cardizem case, the Sixth Circuit
embraced a standard of per se illegality. 94 In contrast, the other three circuit
courts to address this issue have given reverse payment settlements
significant latitude.95 In both the Schering (described above) and Valley
Drug cases, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a standard that acknowledges the
potentially procompetitive nature of these settlements and that gives
significant latitude so long as the patent litigation is not objectively
baseless. 96 Similarly, the Second Circuit applied a rule of reason standard in
88. See Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FTC at 968, 970 (prohibiting settlements under
which the generic manufacturer receives anything of value but carving out an exception for
payments up to $2 million linked to litigation costs).
89. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r., Fed. Trade Comm'n., Oral Statement at the Hearing of the
House Subcomm. on Com., Trade, and Consumer Prot., Comm. on Energy and Com. (May
2, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/
070502reversepayments.pdf).
90. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, at 1, 2, Fed. Trade Comm'n. v.
Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 548 U.S. 919 (2006), denied, No. 05-273 (June 26, 2006).
91. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't. of
Just. to Jon Kyl, U.S. Senator (Feb. 12, 2008).
92. Id.
93. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, Arkansas
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, et al. v. Bayer, AG, et al., 544 F.3d 1323 (2009).
94. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (en
banc), reh'g denied, 332 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2003). The Cardizem case involved an
interim settlement.
95. Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note 3, at 82.
96. See Valley Drug Co., et al. v. Geneva Pharm., et al., 344 F3d 1294, 1304-12 (1 1th
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the Tamoxifen case when affirming the trial court opinion that the
settlements were not anticompetitive.97
Recently, the Federal Circuit applied a similar standard in the Cipro
case. 98 In 1991, Bayer entered into an agreement with generic
manufacturers Barr Labs, Hoechst Marion Roussel, and The Rugby Group
settling patent litigation over Cipro. 99 Under the settlement agreement, Barr
certified that it would not market its generic version prior to the expiration
of Bayer's patent. 100 Bayer paid Barr a lump sum payment and agreed to
either supply Barr with Cipro for resale, or make payments to Barr through
December 2003.101 Consistent with the decisions by the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit concluded that a rule of reason
approach was appropriate and that "[t]he essence of the inquiry is whether
the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the
patent." 10 2 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's conclusion after a
similar inquiry, that the plaintiffs had not shown that the agreement was
anticompetitive.l13
C. "Reverse Payment" and "Exclusion Payments" Are Misnomers
Before presenting our economic analysis of reverse payment settlements,
it is useful to examine the "reverse payment" moniker itself. Such
settlements were named by commentators who believe that a payment from
the brand-name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer flows the
"wrong" way. In a typical patent settlement, the alleged infringer pays the
patent holder, while in a reverse payment settlement the patent holder
(brand-name manufacturer) pays the alleged infringer (generic
manufacturer). 104
This label, however, is based on flawed logic. Hatch-Waxman creates an
unusual circumstance in the pharmaceutical industry whereby the patent
holder can sue the alleged infringer before the infringing products make it
Cir. 2003) (case involved an "interim settlement" of a patent suit between Abbott and
Geneva over generic Hytrin, the litigation continues but the generic manufacturer agrees not
to launch "at risk" while the litigation is ongoing); see generally, James Langenfeld &
Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of
Settlement Agreements with Payments From Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 777, 777-818 (2003).
97. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005).
98. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1331-32 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
99. Id. at 1327.
100. Id at 1328-29.
101. Id. at 1329.
102. Id. at 1336.
103. Id. at 1341.
104. Schildkraut, infra note 106, at 1033-34.
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to market.105
In the typical patent case, the alleged infringer requires some
compensation for abandoning the litigation. 106 In a typical case where the
patent infringer has been on the market for a significant period of time and
would owe significant damages if found liable, the parties may agree to a
settlement where the infringer pays damages to the patent holder, but those
damages are far less than the damages the patent holder is seeking. In this
case, the patent holder pays the infringer to settle the lawsuit by accepting
lower damages - this payment is obscured by the fact that some cash flows
from the infringer to the patent holder. Reverse payment settlements can be
thought of in the same way, but the Hatch-Waxman framework means the
patent holder typically does not incur any damages from sales of the
infringing products, and so the net payment flows from the brand-name
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer. Since nothing nefarious can be
gleaned from the simple fact that the payment flows in a particular
direction, one must examine the underlying economics of these settlement
agreements.
Similarly, the term "exclusion payments" does not accurately reflect the
nature of many of these deals. If the brand-name manufacturer holds an
ultimately valid patent, and the settlement allows the generic manufacturer
to enter the market prior to patent expiration, then the generic was not
"excluded" in any meaningful way. The patent itself provided the ability to
exclude, not the payment.
D. Basic Economic Model
The framework presented above for an analysis of patent settlements can
be used to evaluate reverse payment settlements as well. We start with the
highly simplified case outlined in Figure 1 - no litigation costs, full
information, and risk neutrality - and relax only the assumption requiring
the only term of settlement to be the date of generic entry and allow
settlements to include cash payments. How will this affect the range of
settlements?
Monopoly profits will typically be larger than total profits when the
brand and the generic are both in the market. Of course, brand-name
pharmaceuticals are not necessarily monopolies before the entry of
generics, as patents give only a limited right to exclude identical
105. Generic manufacturers can "enter at risk" - that is enter before final judgment in
the patent litigation - but this is the exception rather than the rule. For example, Mr. Downey
testified that Barr never enters at risk (Downey, supra note 44, at 24).
106. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Correspondence: Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing
Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REv. 698 (2004); see also Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-
Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033 (2004).
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competition and, as such, they may compete with other similar products.
Nonetheless, thinking about the analogy to monopoly profits can provide
insight as to why the parties may have an incentive to agree to delay generic
entry. A year of delay will be more valuable to the brand-name
manufacturer, by allowing for an additional year of "monopoly" profits,
than it costs the generic manufacturer, who only loses a year of contested
profits. As a result, there will be settlements that delay entry beyond Year 5
that both parties prefer to litigation. As shown in Figure 5, this expands the
range of settlements that the brand-name and generic manufacturers could
potentially agree to, but only to include generic entry dates later than Year
5. Consumers will be worse off under these settlements. Of course, without
knowing the precise strength of the patent, observed terms of a particular
settlement agreement could be consistent with delayed generic entry, as
shown in Figure 5, or with a procompetitive settlement where generic entry
occurs sooner than would be expected through litigation.
Thus, a model that ignores real-world complexities can lead to the
conclusion that a settlement with cash payments from the brand to the
generic harms consumers. In the next section, we extend the basic model to
account for the additional complexities that drive real-world settlements.
This analysis demonstrates that relying on the overly simplistic framework
discussed above can frequently lead one to draw incorrect conclusions as to
the competitive effects of a patent settlement.
FIGURE 5
Settlement with Generic Entry Date and Cash Payment
Settlements Generic May Prefer to Litigation
Settlements Brand May Prefer to Litigation
Settlement Range
SettlementPatent
STa lk eExpiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
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E. Introducing Real- World Complexities to the Basic Modl 0 7
1. Overview
Expanding the model to account for other real-world factors
demonstrates that settlements with reverse payments can be procompetitive.
Under certain conditions, without the bargaining tool of a payment from the
brand-name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer, the parties will be
unable to reach agreement on a settlement, even if that settlement would
benefit consumers.
Many economists that have written on this subject agree that when real-
world complexities are taken into account, reverse payment settlements can
be procompetitive.
Shapiro (2003) explained:
This is not to say that such payments are necessarily anticompetitive if
other factors are brought into the analysis, such as risk aversion and
asymmetric information about market conditions, as 'reverse cash
payments' may be important in more complex settings for successful
settlement.
10 8
Bigelow and Willig (2009) share a similar view:
It also follows from economic logic that the opportunity to employ
reverse payments may be necessary for socially beneficial and
procompetitive settlements to be reached, due to such common situations
as asymmetric information, excess optimism, and differential cash needs
between the parties to the patent dispute.
109
Executives in the pharmaceutical industry have expressed similar views.
For example, Bruce Downey, the CEO of generic manufacturer Barr
Pharmaceuticals, testified to Congress that if a law were passed prohibiting
reverse payments "there would be very, very few settlements."'10
2. Cash payments with litigation costs and/or risk aversion
As described above, litigation costs and risk aversion can be important
real-world factors to consider in evaluating patent settlements. Accounting
for both litigation costs and risk aversion expands the range of settlement
107. See generally Willig & Bigelow, supra note 76; John P. Bigelow & Robert D.
Willig, "Reverse Payments" in Settlements of Patent Litigation: Schering-Plough, K-Dur,
and the FTC, in THE ANTITRUST REvOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 248
(5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Reverse Payments].
108. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 408.
109. Reverse Payments, supra note 107, at 273.
110. Downey, supra note 44, at 28.
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agreements that each party is willing to accept. As shown in Figure 6, these
factors expand the range of potential settlements that brand-name
manufacturers will accept (relative to Figure 5), and by creating incentives
for brand-name manufacturers to settle on terms more favorable to
consumers it becomes clear that settlements with reverse payments can be
procompetitive.
FIGURE 6
Settlement with Generic Entry Date and Cash
Payment Litigation Costs
Settlements Generic May Prefer to Litigation
Settlements Brand May Prefer to Litigation
Settlement Range
Procompetitive
Settlements
Settleent IPatent
TalksExpiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
3. Cash payments with a cash-strapped generic
Some observers have argued that, while reverse payment settlements can
leave consumers better off than continued litigation, there is always a
feasible alternative settlement without a payment that will leave consumers
better off than either litigation or a reverse payment settlement."' Under
this argument, a prohibition on reverse payment settlements would
unambiguously leave consumers better off while still allowing the parties to
reap the benefits of settlement, 12 This argument ignores the complexities of
settlement negotiations." 3 In the presence of such complexities, additional
111. See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, at the Center for American
Progress: "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can
Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care
Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009).
112. Id.
113. A related argument is that an alternative settlement with a different payment and a
different entry date may be better for consumers. This is a stricter standard than the one
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flexibility in negotiations may be essential to enabling a proconsumer
settlement between the parties.114 That is, under these circumstances,
without a reverse payment the parties would be unable to reach a settlement
at all.
Two real-world complexities ignored by the basic model are the time
value of money and the possibility of liquidity constraints. The time value
of money refers to the fact that individuals prefer a dollar received today to
a dollar received in the future; thus they discount the value of future cash
flows.11 5 Imagine a small, cash-strapped generic entrant that is having a
difficult time raising needed capital from the financial markets. As a result,
the entrant discounts future profits very heavily; in other words, since it
needs cash, it values near-term profits very highly. This generic
manufacturer will only accept settlements that allow for relatively early
entry, which under the conditions of the example illustrated in Figure 7a
would not be acceptable to the brand-name manufacturer.
FIGURE 7A
Settlement with Generic Entry Date and No Cash Payment Cash-Strapped
Generic and Litigation Costs/Risk Aversion
Generic Prefers
Settlementto NoLitigation Acceptable Settlements Brand May Prefer to Litigation
: Settlement
Range
S Settlement I Ptn
Talks
Consumers Prefer Settlement to Litigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
The latest entry date to which the cash-strapped generic would be willing
to agree is earlier than the earliest date to which the brand-name
manufacturer would be willing to agree. As a result, settlement talks would
break down.
commonly used by antitrust regulators to evaluate agreements among competitors, which
evaluates competition relative to a world without the agreement, rather than a world with an
optimal agreement. See FED. TRADE COMM'N AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (April 2000).
114. Reverse Payments, supra note 107, at 248-74.
115. PINDYCK&RUBINFELD, supra note 64, at §15.1.
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FIGURE 7B
Settlement with Generic Entry Date and Cash Payment Cash-Strapped
Generic and Litigation Costs/Risk Aversion
Settlements Generic May Prefer to Litigation
Settlements Brand May Prefer to Litigation
Procompetitive
Settlements
Possible only Settlement Range
with Cash
Paymenta to
Stlmn Generic PatentTks Expiration
Consumers Prefer Settlement t oLitigation
Start of Year 1 End of Year 5 End of Year 10
A cash payment by the brand-name manufacturer may allow the brand-
name and generic manufacturers to bridge the settlement gap shown in
Figure 7a. The brand-name manufacturer would be willing to include a cash
payment in the settlement in exchange for a later generic entry date. The
generic manufacturer would be willing to accept later entry in exchange for
a cash payment. As described above, the incremental profits that a brand-
name manufacturer would receive because of postponed generic entry
would be higher than the incremental profits that the generic manufacturer
would lose from delaying its entry to a more competitive market. Thus, a
given cash payment will expand the range of entry dates that the brand-
name manufacturer is willing to accept later in time, but it will move the
dates the generic is willing to accept to an even greater extent. Such a
payment will bring the parties closer together, potentially bridging the
settlement gap. As shown in Figure 7b, under these circumstances, reverse
payments can lead to a range of settlements that would not have been
otherwise feasible. Importantly, many of these newly conceivable
settlements would benefit consumers by resulting in a generic entry date
earlier than that expected through continued litigation.
4. Cash payments with an optimistic generic
Cash payments can also help bridge settlement gaps arising under other
circumstances. For example, imagine a generic manufacturer that, despite
actual odds of winning the patent suit of only fifty percent, believes that it
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in fact has a seventy five-percent chance of winning. This mismatch of
beliefs and actual probabilities could create a situation similar to that
depicted in 7a, where (absent a reverse payment) the generic manufacturer
would not be willing to accept any settlement terms the brand-name
manufacturer would be willing to offer due to the generic manufacturer's
unrealistic belief about its chance of winning. Just as with a cash-strapped
generic, a reverse payment can potentially bridge the settlement gap and
lead to a settlement that benefits consumers. Of course, it is possible that
the brand-name manufacturer is also overly optimistic about its odds of
success in the litigation, which would reduce the range of procompetitive
settlements that a cash payment could generate. The point is not that these
are the only scenarios that could play out, but rather that there are
reasonable scenarios under which a patent settlement with a reverse
payment can benefit consumers.
5. Cash payments with information asymmetries
Brand-name and the generic manufacturers rarely have access to
identical information; each almost certainly possesses certain information
that the other does not. Willig and Bigelow describe how this information
asymmetry can create another circumstance where cash payments may
facilitate a procompetitive settlement agreement that would not otherwise
be feasible.
1 16
Imagine that the brand-name manufacturer has private information about
the effective life of the patent; for example, the prospects of future
competition from other brand-name products. The generic entrant knows
that the brand-name manufacturer is better informed about future
competition, and therefore will interpret settlement offers from the brand-
name manufacturer with this in mind.
Suppose there are two types of patents: "high-value" patents, where there
is no chance that other brand-name competitors enter before the patent
expires, and "low-value" patents, where there is a decent chance that such
brand-name entry happens, significantly reducing the effective life, and the
value, of the current patent. The brand-name manufacturer knows which
type of patent it holds, while the generic manufacturer does not.1 17 In the
case of a low-value patent, agreeing to a compromise entry date may have
little benefit to the generic because the market may be eliminated by future
116. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 76 at 661.
117. Economic models on this point often assume that the branded manufacturer knows
the type of patent it holds with certainty. However, the results depend not upon this
assumption (as there may be some uncertainty even on the part of the branded manufacturer)
but only that the branded manufacturer will have better information on the type of the patent
than the generic manufacturer.
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competition; as a result, a generic may be wary of accepting a reasonable
settlement offer because it worries that such a settlement may indicate that
in fact the patent is low-value, and that the generic would be better off
pursuing litigation."'
The problems created by information asymmetries can be overcome if
the brand-name manufacturer is allowed to provide a cash payment to the
generic manufacturer. In our example, only brand-name manufacturers with
high-value patents would find it profitable to offer an up-front payment to
the generic. Thus, the generic can interpret the reverse payment as a signal
that the patent is high value, and have strong reason to believe that the
settlement offer is in fact a good offer from a brand-name manufacturer
with a high-value patent, rather than a poor offer from a brand-name
manufacturer with a low-value patent. Here again, cash payments can
facilitate settlements - including procompetitive settlements - that would
not be reached if such payments were not allowed.
6. Collateral business agreements
Many settlements between brand-name and generic manufacturers
involve collateral business agreements. These agreements may take a
variety of forms, including:
9 Brand-name manufacturer licenses products from the generic
manufacturer;
* Generic manufacturer licenses products from the brand-name
manufacturer;
9 Generic manufacturer agrees to co-promote one or more of the
brand-name manufacturer's products; and/or
e Generic manufacturer agrees to serve as supplier for the brand-
name manufacturer.1 19
Such collateral agreements can be helpful in facilitating settlements by
allowing the parties to get around some of the complexities discussed above
that may otherwise pose obstacles to successful settlements like information
asymmetries and differences in expectations. 120 Unlike cash, the parties'
valuations of the components of a collateral business arrangement may be
quite different. This difference in valuation could be used to offset different
118. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 76, at 668.
119. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2007 3 (2007).
120. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 76, at 669.
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expectations in the patent litigation to arrive at a settlement. In addition,
these collateral agreements could in and of themselves benefit consumers,
bringing together business partnerships that would not be possible with
continued litigation. But while these collateral agreements can serve to
facilitate settlements, they could also, in theory, contain "effective"
payments that are designed to delay entry of the generic, if the generic
manufacturer is over-compensated, or the brand-name manufacturer under-
compensated. 121
In recent years, patent settlements with collateral business agreements
have received significant regulatory and legal scrutiny.122 For example, as
described above, the agreement between Schering and Upsher that was
challenged by the FTC did not involve an isolated cash payment to the
generic. Rather, in settling the patent dispute, Schering also licensed six
different products from Upsher, including Upsher's Niacor SR, in exchange
for royalty payments of $60 million.123 The FTC argued that the $60 million
royalty payments were well above the value of the licensed products, and
124that the payments were just another means to delay generic entry.'
Evaluating the competitive implications of settlements with collateral
business arrangements is even more complicated than those with cash
payments. Such an analysis first requires an evaluation of the collateral
business transaction to determine a reasonable assessment of the market
value of the transaction. 125 To the extent that it is clear from the evidence
that the generic was over-compensated or the brand was under-
compensated, the difference between the payment and the arms-length
value of the transaction can be thought of in the same way as a "reverse
payment." While collateral business transactions, just like reverse
payments, can be anticompetitive, they may also serve to produce
procompetition outcomes, some of which may not have been otherwise
feasible.
V. LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
The discussion to this point has focused on the short-run competitive
effects of patent settlements. Clearly, patent settlements can be
procompetitive, even when focusing on short-run competition; however,
patent settlements can also have important long-term competitive effects.
121. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data &
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 663-665 (2009).
122. Id. at 135.
123. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d, at 1068.
124. See id, at 1070 (FTC did not convincingly demonstrate that the $60 million was not
simply a royalty payment within the range of fair market value for the licensed products).
125. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 408.
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First, the scope of patent protection can affect future incentives for brand-
name manufacturers to invest in additional R&D. Patents give patent
holders the right to litigate claims against alleged infringers, and the right to
settle such litigation, at least, as long as such a settlement does not exclude
competition beyond that allowed by the patent. 126 Broad-brush limits on the
types of patent settlements that are allowed by pharmaceutical
manufacturers would likely result in a narrowing of the patent protection
currently provided to patent holders. 127 As described above, such patent
protection is an important component of pharmaceutical manufacturers'
incentives to invest substantial sums in R&D and to introduce new
medications. To the extent that limits on patent settlements reduce
incentives to invest in pharmaceutical R&D, consumers may suffer
significant adverse effects in the long-run, in the form of a smaller number
of new medicines that become available. 128
Second, the availability of procompetitive settlements can provide
further incentives to generic manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents
and bring lower-priced generic drugs to market.1 29 Patent litigation can be
expensive and risky, particularly for small firms. Restricting the range of
settlement options will reduce the ability of generic manufacturers to settle
these cases and increase the cost and risk of bringing a generic drug to
market. On the margin, this will lower the incentives for generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents in the first
place. 130 Even if the effect on a particular generic manufacturer's decision is
relatively small, the collective impact on future generic competition can be
substantial.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Designing a workable framework that distinguishes procompetitive
settlements from anticompetitive settlements is difficult, in part because, at
its core, such a framework depends upon the validity of the patent claims. A
settlement agreement whereby the generic manufacturer agrees to enter the
market five years in the future, but also five years before the expiration of
the patent, might be anticompetitive if the patent was weak (i.e., if the
generic had a high probability of winning at trial). However, the same
126. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1067.
127. In re Tamoxifen Citrate AntitrustLitig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2nd Cir. 2006).
128. For a more extensive discussion of these effects, see James Langenfeld & Wenqing
Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement
Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manuftcturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.
J. 777-818 (2003).
129. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Il. 2003).
130. See, e.g., id.
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settlement terms might be procompetitive if the patent was strong (i.e., if
the generic had a low probability of winning at trial). Ultimately, an
evaluation of the competitive effects of a patent settlement must include an
investigation into the merits of the patent litigation.
While antitrust economists generally agree with this line of argument,
some analysts have suggested prohibiting settlements with "reverse
payments;" several bills have been introduced in Congress that would do
just that. 131
However, as we explain above, under many circumstances, patent
settlements between brand-name and generic manufacturers - even those
involving reverse payments - can enhance competition and benefit
consumers. An outright prohibition of reverse payment settlements would
harm consumer welfare in a range of circumstances. Indeed, prohibiting
settlements with cash payments could simply lead to a shift to settlements
involving other business arrangements that are even more complicated to
evaluate, making enforcement of potentially anticompetitive arrangements
even more difficult to assess. Efforts to prevent settlements with any
compensation, whether in the form of cash or collateral business
arrangements, flowing from the brand-name manufacturer to the generic
would similarly block many pro-consumer settlements. Of course, an
outright prohibition on such settlements would reduce the uncertainty and
litigation costs that may follow from antitrust challenges to such
settlements; however, it is not at all clear that these savings would outweigh
the harm created by eliminating potentially procompetitive settlements.
"Quick look" or "safe harbor" approaches (whereby settlements with
certain characteristics are presumptively anticompetitive or procompetitive,
while leaving open the opportunity to rebut this presumption) could reduce
these costs while still allowing procompetitive settlements.
Moreover, a restrictive policy approach that sought to bar reverse
payment settlements would not only have short-term impacts by preventing
procompetitive settlements, but may harm consumers in the long-run by
reducing the incentives of brand-name manufacturers to continue to develop
innovative new drugs, and reducing the incentives of generic manufacturers
to challenge weak patents and bring generic drugs to market sooner.
Patent settlements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical
manufactures can be anticompetitive and should continue to be closely
scrutinized by antitrust authorities and the courts; indeed, current law
requires that the terms of any relevant patent settlement agreement be
provided to the FTC and the DOJ. But painting all settlements with the
same brush is likely to harm consumers. Instead, more individualized
131. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009);
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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treatment is appropriate, whereby the competitive effects of a particular
settlement are evaluated by applying an economic framework to the facts
specific to that settlement.
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